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INTRODUCTION
The art of monetary policy-making by central banks has been subjected to rigorous research in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis. Various dimensions of monetary policymaking-its objectives, tools for operationalizing the same and the complexities arising from global macro-economic environment-have received wide academic attention in recent times.
The research focuses largely on incorporating learnings from the recent global financial crisis into the day-to-day functioning of central banks around the world.
Against the backdrop descrived above, the experience of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI -having its head office on Mint Street in Mumbai, India) during the previous decade (2003-04 to 2013-14) offers interesting perspectives in the area of monetary policy making. At the time of the global financial crisis, RBI was credited as one of the few central banks in the world that insulated the country's domestic banking system from the impact of the global financial crisis.
However, following the financial crisis, the RBI experienced challenges in the pursuit of monetary policy-making arising from the impact of global macro-economic developments, structural issues in domestic economy, and volatility in domestic exchange rates. This paper therefore uses the experience of the RBI as a case study to outline the challenges to the art of monetary policy-making in emerging economies. This paper uses Hyman P. Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis as the conceptual framework for evaluating the endogenous nature of financial instability and the limitations of monetary policy in containing the same. This paper addresses the need to pursue appropriate regulatory policy as a tool that is complementary to the monetary policy in light of the agenda of reforms put forward by Minsky. This paper further reviews the extensions to Minskian hypothesis in the areas of fiscal policy management, managing cross-border capital flows, and development of financial institutional infrastructure. The learnings arising from inter-play of policy choices in these areas and their impact on monetary policy-making at the RBI are presented in the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW-MINSKY AND MONETARY POLICY
Minsky demonstrated, using the Financial Instability Hypothesis, how banks and other financial institutions could, as they became increasingly complex and interdependent, bring the entire economic system crashing down. Writings on Minsky (Wray 2007 , Roubini 2010 , Keen 2011 indicate that the Minskian analysis is in turn built on insights of great non-neoclassical thinkers like Schumpeter, Fisher, and Keynes. However, Minsky's strength, as Keen (2011, p.326 ) points out, was to weave these "individually powerful and cohesive but incomplete analysis into one coherent tapestry that explained the occasional depressions the capitalist economy is inherently 
a) Financial Instability Hypothesis-An Overview
Prior to the global financial crisis in 2007-08, monetary policy-making by central banks was dominated by mainstream economics that relied on theories such as the efficient market hypothesis. The dominant thinking in academic and policy-making circles at that time therefore was that while external adverse shocks can push markets away from their natural optimal state, markets that are by definition equilibrium-seeking systems will attain a steady course on their own without external influence (Cooper 2010) . Therefore, there cannot be any internal destabilizing force in the market, nor is any external intervention required to restore market equilibrium in case of exceptional situations (Bezemer 2009 ). Central banks that believed in these theories developed their policy actions with the overarching philosophy that they really should not be in the business of figuring out when asset prices are too high; after all, they do not really know much more than market participants (Allen and Gale 2007 , Borio 2003 , Roubini 2010 . Further, as markets naturally achieve an optimal equilibrium, central banks supporting the efficient market hypothesis also believed that any interference with market forces can at best achieve nothing, but will more likely push the system away from equilibrium towards a sub-optimal state (Rajan 2010) . As Roubini (2010, p. 4) points out, academic community and regulators that believed in these principles therefore considered that financial crises are "freak events: highly improbable, extremely unusual, largely unpredictable and fleeting in their consequences."
If markets are believed to be fundamentally stable as per the mainstream efficient market hypothesis, "can IT -a spectacular collapse such as the Great Economic Depression of 1929 -happen again?" This was the question Minsky focused upon through his various essays on instability and finance. To answer this question, mainstream economic theory prior to the crisis, dominated by monetary theorists (and in particular those led by Friedman and Schwartz (1963)) argued that the great economic depression of 1929 was a classic case of central banks failing to take quick and decisive action and it was not fundamental failure of stability of markets. The monetary theorists claimed that the failure of central banks to resort to timely monetary policy easing during 1929, when they anticipated recession, resulted in falling levels of aggregate demand in the economy. A free market economy without excessive regulatory intervention was therefore still considered a valid premise if the central bank could swiftly handle the recessionary situations by keeping the financial system from imploding, and restoring the market, through effective monetary policy action (Moore 1979 , Kydland and Prescott 1990 , Krugman and Eggertsson 2012 . Rajan (2010, p.101) argued that, based on these theories, central bankers have become "triumphant" even in making public statements that the policy levers for managing a modern economy were well understood by them. Policy makers have therefore showcased periods of milder recessions in the pre-crisis period as a testimony of their achievements (Greenspan 1997 , Bernanke 2004 ).
However, in order to answer the question as to whether the great depression can happen again, Minsky believed that it is necessary to call for an alternative economic theory that makes great depressions as one of the possible states within which the real world capitalist economy can find itself. Minsky (1984, p. 16) argued that, "if a theory is to explain an event, the event must be possible within the theory. Furthermore, if a theory is to guide policy that aims at controlling or preventing an event, the event must be possible within the theory." According to
Minsky, when judged against this standard, extant mainstream economic theory based on the efficient market hypothesis suffers from serious limitations. In particular, the extant theory concludes that crises are extremely rare events, which can occur only because of policy errors or from non-essential institutional flaws.
Minsky rejected mainstream economics as irrelevant in analysing a real-world capitalist economy and instead argued that "stability is destabilising" (Papadimitriou and Wray 2008 p. xii). Minsky, according to them, believed that relative tranquility gradually encourages more risk-taking and innovative behavior, while disrupting the conditions that generate coherence and tranquility. That is, the market forces that operate when a system is stable will push it toward instability, so that even if anything like equilibrium could be achieved, it would be offset by behavioral responses that would quickly move the economy away from equilibrium. This difference in Minsky's treatment of capitalist economy had two different academic implications.
First, unlike other critical analyses of capitalist processes, which emphasize the crash, Minsky was more concerned with the behavior of corporate agents and financial institutions during the euphoric periods. Second, unlike other analyses that blame "shocks," "irrational exuberance," or "foolish" policy, Minsky argued that the processes that generate financial fragility are "natural"
or "endogenous" to the system (Papadimitriou and Wray 2008, p. xii) .
b) Bank Finance, Financial Instability and Limitations of Monetary Policy
Minsky stated that, the "overall fragility-robustness of the financial structure, upon which the cyclical stability of the economy depends, emerges out of loans made by bankers" (Minsky 2008 (Minsky [1986 , p. 261). Minsky explained the endogenous process by stating that operating units in an economy are primarily dependent upon the immediate credit extended by banks to finance the investment in capital assets that can generate cash flows in the future. He provided insights into the borrowing behavior of these operating units by separating them into three types of borrowers-hedge borrowers (whose source of repayment of debt in its entirety is operating income), speculative borrowers (who use operating income for repayment of interest but rely on new loans for repayment of the principal) and Ponzi borrowers (whose operating income is not sufficient to even repay the interest obligation). Minsky stated that the borrowing units create increased demand for bank finance over a period of time, which creates disequilibrating pressures in the economy. The more the demand for investment finance by operating units, the more the profit-seeking bankers will find ways of accommodating their customers and as a result, the "supply of financing from banks grows so fast that prices of capital assets, prices of investment output, and finally, prices of consumption output all rise" (Minsky 2008 (Minsky [1986 , p.
264). Bank finance thus sets the stage for financing an inflationary expansion by unleashing the "animal spirits" of the operating units. The way to deal with inflationary growth through expansion of credit by banks is to curtail the supply of bank finance through monetary policy tools available at the disposal of central banks. Minsky (1984) therefore examined the efficacy of two traditional monetary policy tools of central banks-manipulation of reserve requirements and increasing interest rates-for curtailing the supply of money in the system. Minsky explains that reserve-ratio manipulation as a central bank tool assumes the operation of the money-multiplier theory, which postulates a decrease in money supply by banks through an increase in deposit reserve requirements by a central bank. However, as Holmes (1969) argues, the money multiplier model theoretically assumes that the banking system expands only after the central bank puts reserves in the banking system, but in the real world, banks extend credit, creating deposits in the process, and look for reserves later. Overtveldt (2010) also argues that the money-multiplier model is practically difficult to operate, as profit-seeking bankers tend to always look for alternative funding sources that are not subject to reserve requirements. In the process, banks endeavor to
give ever greater promises of safety to alternative fund providers either by shortening the term of liabilities or by providing special assurances. This results in the creation of new funding sources by banks through innovative financial instruments. Minsky, therefore, argued that normal profit seeking by banks through innovation continually subverts the attempts by authorities to constrain money-supply growth through deposit reserves (Minsky 1984 ).
Minsky examined the other central banking tool-increase in interest rates-for controlling the money supply, which forces banks to tighten financing terms (by increasing the rate of interest or demanding better collateral). The supply price of investment finance therefore exceeds the demand price and a period of credit contraction sets in. During this phase, some of the firms involved in "hedge finance" are shunted to the "speculative finance" group and those involved in the speculative finance group become "Ponzi borrowers." As borrowers are shunted to the next level, panic sets in in the market as borrowers fear a mounting debt burden. This results in sudden contraction of credit and distress sales for repayment of bank finance, leading to falling asset prices and debt deflation, and eventually crisis sets in (Kindleberger and Aliber 2005) . Thus the central bank could indirectly trigger a crisis if it resorts to an increase in the interest rate to curtail money supply growth.
By examining these alternatives, Minsky argued that it is evident that controlling the money supply in order to stabilize the economy, from the inherent destabilizing forces leading to inflationary growth, is not sufficient. In his view, this will either be ineffective (if central banks pursue a manipulation of reserve ratios) or result in a dismal cycle that brings about debt deflation (if central banks pursue a manipulation of interest rates).
The aforementioned paragraphs deal with ineffectiveness of monetary policy in an expansionary phase to curtail excessive growth through bank finance in an economy. Cooper (2005 Cooper ( , 2010 , however, explained the Minskian hypothesis as to why monetary policy will be ineffective during recessionary periods for stimulating the growth. Cooper (2005) argued that the use of a monetary policy tool (by lowering interest rates) for reviving economic growth by central banks during recession acts as an "indiscriminate-asymmetric stimulus" characterised by a low-interest rate regime for an indefinitely long period of time. The continued success of such a policy provokes central banks to pursue monetary tweakening over a period of time not necessarily when growth was actually weakened but even before when it was "anticipated" to be weakened. Such an action will be considered asymmetric when the low-interest rate stimulus is used when economic growth is weak while doing nothing to subsequently counter strong growth for a relatively long period of time. Cooper (2005) argued that such a monetary policy stance encourages the economy to behave like an unstable positive feedback system (in which a change to the system produces conditions that increase the magnitude of that change), thereby promoting destabilizing tendencies in the economy.
Therefore, to conclude in the words of Minsky, "if we are to bring a halt to the dismal cycle, far-reaching structural reforms are needed" in the capitalist financial system (Minsky 1984, p. 200) .
c) Regulation as a Supplementary Tool to Monetary Policy
Without subjecting his recommendations to mathematical rigour, Minsky stressed that "periodic reforms of the banking system are needed to prevent the development of a financially unstable economy that cannot readily be contained" (Minsky 2008 (Minsky [1986 Minsky's agenda for regulatory reforms, which he termed as having an anti-aaissez-faire theme, therefore emphasise that "in a world where the internal dynamics imply instability, a semblance of stability can be achieved or sustained by introducing conventions, constraints and interventions into the environment" by central banks (Ferri and Minsky 1991, p. 21) . Minsky criticized that the mainstream economic theory leads to the conclusion that regulatory arrangements reflect superstition and ignorance. He stated that this conclusion was arrived at because the mainstream theory assumes that the financial instability phenomena, which central bank regulations and discretionary power are designed to deal with, do not exist in nature.
However, according to Minsky, regulatory powers need to be exercized by central banks in a manner that they should be able to "steer the evolution of financial structure" (Minsky 2008 [1986], p. 359).
Minsky (2008 [1986] "To contain the evils that market systems can inflict, capitalist economies developed sets of institutions and authorities, which can be characterized as the equivalent of circuit breakers. These institutions in effect stop the economic processes that breed incoherence and restart the economy with new initial conditions" (Minsky et al 1994, p. 6 ). Model for bringing into discussion the role of fiscal policy as the necessary, though not always sufficient, condition for achievement of major objectives of macroeconomic policy. In their view, the monetary economics "holds that a correct setting of interest rates is the necessary and sufficient condition for achieving non-inflationary growth at full employment, leaving fiscal policy rather in the air." They considered that such disregard of fiscal policy and the emphasis only on monetary policy is quite misplaced as, at least in theory, fiscal policy could achieve everything the central banks can be able to do through monetary policy for achieving economic stability. Using SFC model, they stated that "measured at current prices, the government's budget deficit less the current account deficit is equal, by definition, to private saving net of investment." The model was applied by Godley and Lavoie to US sectoral position at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s which depicted a public sector budgetary surplus, a trade sector deficit and a private sector deficit (Keen 2013 Godley and Lavoie (2007) argued that this situation can be remedied through an active fiscal policy by allowing the government to increase public expenditure and run into deficit. This conclusion however is subject to certain presumptions -firstly, fiscal stance should be set in appropriate fashion at a well-defined level and growth rate (Godley and Lavoie 2007) and secondly, it should be applied in conditions in which households, firms, and financial institutions are seeking to increase savings (Kregel 2007) . In such circumstances, through SFC model, Godley and Lavoie argued that even fiscal policy delivers sustainable full employment at a target inflation rate even at an arbitrary (though not correct) interest rate setting. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) argue that the globalisation phenomenon in recent decades increased the inter-connectedness amongst nations. They argue that banking crises were relatively rare earlier due to capital and financial controls, but have increasingly become common since the 1970s often in tandem with currency crises. As nations and their financial systems are increasingly inter-connected through cross-border trade and capital flows, a shock in one part of the financial system spreads through the other parts through a series of global 'linkages'. The linkages generally include inter-bank claims and flow of information about market fundamentals. If these fundamentals are common to other markets, the expected returns, and hence, prices in those markets will also fall. Considering that it is optimal for banks to hold deposits in banks in other regions or sectors in order to provide liquidity if demand is unusually high, when one region suffers a banking crisis, the other regions suffer a loss because their claims on banks in the troubled region fall in value. If the spillover effect is strong enough, it causes a panic in adjacent regions. The panic gets stronger as it passes from region to region and finally becomes a contagion leading to a full-blown crisis (Allen and Gale, 2007; Kodres and Pritsker, 1998) . Barton et al., (2003) argue that when the panic dimension collides with the inherent banking fragility, they set off a chain reaction and a country begins to spiral downward, as panic and loss of confidence increase problems in the banking system as well as the real economy at the macro-economic level. While Wolf (2008) therefore agreed with the role of leverage as proposed by Minsky as a valid explanation for financial crises, he did not buy into the argument that regulatory intervention could alone prevent them. Wolf (2008) argued that the pattern of global imbalances and associated policies also play a large role in setting the explosive charge, resulting in economies becoming highly fragile. The response, according to
d) Extensions to Financial Instability Hypothesis

Cross-border Flows and Financial Stability
Wolf, is to call for limiting the scale of macro-economic imbalances, rather than regulatory intervention, since they frequently exacerbate the financial fragility.
Financial Institutional Infrastructure and Financial Stability
Minsky ( and investment, and the lowest average inflation since Indian independence (see Table 1 Against this background, it would be relevant to examine Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis as it rejected the equilibrium methodology of mainstream economics as irrelevant in analyzing a real-world economy and instead argued that "stability is destabilizing." According to Minsky, relative tranquility gradually encourages more risk taking and innovative behavior that increases income even as it disrupts the conditions that generate coherence and tranquility.
That is, the market forces that operate when a system is stable will push it toward instability, so that even if anything like equilibrium could be achieved, it would be offset by behavioral responses that would quickly move the economy away from equilibrium. Indian banks prepare for periods of instability during the stable economic growth phase. Second, the comprehensiveness of coverage of regulated entities by the RBI during this phase is explained. Third, the manner in which regulations are pursued by the RBI in the area of financial innovation based on its comfort of market developments is outlined.
b) Counter-Cyclical Regulatory Policies
Minsky (2008 [1986] , p. 280) stated that the "regime of regulation by the authorities...is intended to control the destabilizing forces inherent in banking and finance." This Minskian insight could be reflected in the RBI's experience during 2003-07, during which the policies of the RBI were aimed at achieving financial stability while maintaining growth momentum at reasonable levels, and giving a high priority to price stability. Some of the regulatory measures taken by the RBI during this period could be considered counter-cyclical (as they were taken when the environment was stable, which provided enough flexibility for monetary policy management). Some of these counter-cyclical measures organized in a chronological sequence below required the Indian banks to (Reddy 2008 In particular, a summary of the gradual increase in the risk weights prescribed by the RBI while arriving at a capital adequacy ratio and the additional provisioning requirements for certain sensitive sectors identified by the RBI during the periods prior to the crisis (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) is summarized in Table 3 below. Sinha, Deputy Governor, RBI (2011) In summary, the counter-cyclical approach adopted by the RBI is summarized by Dr. Reddy (2008, p. 14) in a manner resonating the Minskian insights as follows:
"While monetary policy influences aggregates, reality is often dis-aggregated. Hence, the RBI uses prudential regulatory policies to complement the monetary policy measures and objectives. It is pertinent that the lender of last resort function is not separate either from monetary and liquidity management or from financial regulation. Thus both monetary policy and prudential regulations are used as complementary tools to achieve the central bank objectives and they both support and reinforce each other."
c) Regulatory Coverage and Regulatory Comfort
In addition to regulatory guidelines in the form of risk weights and risk provisions, the RBI's regulatory philosophy during the period prior to the crisis involved ensuring comprehensive regulatory coverage within the financial system and permitting certain business practices only based on regulatory comfort. Each of these aspects is explained below.
Regulatory coverage refers to the measures adopted by the RBI prior to the crisis to ensure that a) the regulatory regime effectively covers the usage of instruments of risk transfer so that risk does not merely pass from one institution to another without having intended prudential regulatory impact; b) the inter-connectedness amongst banks within the system is carefully monitored; and c) the non-bank financial companies (NBFCs) are also effectively brought into the regulatory ambit. As per the guidelines issued in February 2006, the RBI prescribed a conservative treatment of securitization exposures (which could be used as an instrument of risk transfer) for capital adequacy purposes, especially with regard to credit enhancement and liquidity facilities. Under these guidelines, banks are not permitted to recognize any profits on the sale of assets to the SPV immediately on sale, but over the life of the underlying securities issued. In December 2006, the RBI placed a major thrust on strengthening the regulatory framework with regard to NBFCs by way of a revised framework to address issues pertaining to the overall regulation of systemically important NBFCs and the relationship between banks and NBFCs. Finally, through its regulatory guidelines issued in March 2007, the RBI sought to limit the extent of inter-bank liabilities to a proportion of the bank's net worth and also restrict the extent to which they access the inter-bank call money market both as a lender and as a borrower.
Regulatory comfort continued to be one of the guiding principles of the RBI regulatory regime prior to the crisis. Regulatory comfort arises, especially in the context of financial innovation, when there is a need for synchronization between regulators' skills and sophistication required for financial markets. One of the proposals following the recent global financial crisis was that there is a need to improve regulatory skills in order to enable authorities to regulate the financial sector better. In opposition, Dr. Reddy (2011, p. 148) argued that "sophistication in financial sector should be permitted only to the extent that regulatory skills are able to manage." In other words, the approach of the RBI prior to the crisis was to restrict sophistication in financial markets, recognizing the skills to regulate them are difficult to build Regulatory relaxation makes the institutional structures, which were construed as thwarting mechanisms ineffective in a phase-wise manner (Ferri and Minsky 1991) . First, the relaxation process begins with "regulatory capture," whereby regulatory institutions, such as central banks, The pursuit of both monetary and fiscal policies immediately after the crisis thus represented a coordinated policy response. However, the timing of exit strategies from these stimulus responses were different with monetary policy taking the lead in reversing the expansionary stance prior to the fiscal policy tightening that took place subsequently. In the intervening years, therefore the country witnessed certain macro-economic vulnerabilities which are outlined in subsequent paragraphs.
b) Fiscal Policy After the 2007 Crisis
The pursuit of fiscal policy from 2008-09 should not only be analyzed in the backdrop of the financial crisis that occurred mid-way during the year, but also keeping in perspective that the country had undertaken general elections of the central government in May 2009. Therefore, the fiscal stimulus measures in response to the crisis were largely on top of an already expanded safety net for the rural poor, a farm loan waiver package, and salary increases for government staff (Reddy 2011) . This led to a sudden surge in the fiscal deficit of the Government of India to 5.9% in 2008-09, and it continued to rise to 6.4% in 2009-10. However, there was slippage in the fiscal deficit in 2010-11 to 4.79%, largely due to the one-off revenue windfall through spectrum auctions and divestments. The fiscal deficit thereafter went up to 5.82 considering factors such as over-dependence of government on non-durable sources of revenue, inadequate pruning of subsidies, and mounting interest burden on government debt (see Table 4 below).
These aspects are further analyzed in the subsequent paragraphs. The Indian fiscal indicators, such as those depicted above, demonstrate that the tax and non-tax revenue contribution to the government exchequer was largely dominated by the latter indicating a non-durable nature of government deficit financing. In fact, at a tax-GDP ratio of around 10%, India has one of the lowest ratios,even as lower middle-income countries had tax-GDP ratios of above 15%. Even among G20 countries, India had the third-lowest tax base before Mexico and Indonesia, with a major portion of tax revenue coming from indirect taxes indicating a regressive taxation regime in the country (World Bank 2012). Three reasons are generally cited for these low tax-GDP levels in the country (Moody 2011). First, structural factors such as low average incomes and a high poverty rate result in a very small portion of the labor force being eligible to pay personal income taxes. Second, in light of various exemption and compliance issues, a large portion of profit earned by economic activities of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are not fully tapped into the taxation net. Third, there is lack of non-conventional tax policy initiatives to improve tax collection (for instance the agricultural income in India is tax free; service tax collection does not contribute significantly to the national exchequer). Thus the fiscal deficit financing in the country relies significantly on non-tax revenues, which are non-durable in nature.
On the expenditure side, subsidies constitute a major source of fiscal risk. The
Government of India has long embarked on the path of subsidizing key commodities such as petrol/ diesel, fertilizers, and food. Subsidies are used as a fiscal policy tool to significantly even out the volatility that otherwise could emerge, for instance, in the case of petrol/diesel and fertilizers, if the full pass-through of global fuel price shocks to domestic prices was allowed.
While subsidies could thus be a tool for inflation management in the short term, it poses a significant fiscal burden due to persistent high prices in international markets (RBI 2009 ). In addition, the food subsidy has increased substantially in recent years on account of a widening gap between the central issue price of wheat and rice and the economic cost of delivering these food grains. Debate on subsidies also raises concern regarding the way they proliferated over a "The Indian economy is presently poised on the edge of a fiscal precipice, making corrective measures aimed at speedy fiscal consolidation an imperative necessity if serious adverse consequences stemming from this situation are to be averted in an efficient and timely manner."
c) Fiscal Policy Implications on Monetary Policy
As outlined in the literature review section, increased fiscal deficit has the potential to result in an alarming level of government public debt and pose macro-economic vulnerabilities in the form of inflation, reduce room for monetary policy stimulus, increase the risk of external sector imbalances, and dampen private investment, growth and employment (Blinder 1982) .
In the Indian context, the above conclusions were summarized in the RBI's Report on Table 5 below: In order to understand the operational aspects of fiscal constraint on monetary policy, it would be important to examine the inflationary trends in the Indian economy following the 2007 crisis. As stimulus measures led to an expansionary monetary policy in the initial years after the crisis, the growth process entrenched, but led to a resurgence of inflationary pressures. The RBI, therefore, exited the accommodative monetary policy, which it pursued until October 2009, and adopted a more calibrated approach between January 2010 and October 2011. This led to high interest rate levels in the economy, adding up pressure on the RBI to reverse the monetary policy stance. Such demands were also put forward from various quarters considering the fact that the economy resurfaced downside risks to economic growth in the second half of 2011-12.
However, the RBI in its 2009 report indicated that monetary policy will generally be constrained from reducing interest rates in two situations that characterized the current state of the Indian economy-the need for financing the fiscal deficit and the structural nature of inflation.
It is generally argued that the fiscal deficit through its crowding out effect leads to an increase in the price level in the economy with a corresponding reduction in the overall output.
In such a situation, even if the monetary authority decides to offset the impact of higher interest rates by increasing the money supply, it may not increase the output but it may push up the price level in the short run (Sargent and Wallace 1981) . This is because a reduction in monetary financing in the short run would imply more bond financing, which would push up interest rates.
This, in turn, would lead to higher interest payments and, thus, larger budget deficits over time.
Given the perceived limits to the government's ability to service a progressively higher order of bond obligations, monetary financing would be inevitable and large eventually, which would have inflationary consequences. On the other hand, the Indian experience with inflation suggested that "food" and "fuel" prices constitute significant components, which increase the rate of inflation measured by Wholesale Price Index in the economy. As these are supply-side price shocks that are not transitory in nature, conventional monetary policy tools to deal with inflation management (such as a reduction in interest rates) might not be effective (Mohanty 2010 ).
d) Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy-Summary
During 2010-11/2011-12, the mix of expansionary fiscal policy and contractionary monetary policy therefore led to high interest rates on one hand and has placed a constraint on the RBI to reduce them further, on the other hand. The RBI therefore has outlined the need for pursuing the path of fiscal consolidation by the government, through its Half-Yearly Financial Stability
Reports (RBI FSR 2013 and RBI FSR 2014) . The government responded to the situation by constituting the Kelkar Committee for drawing out a road map for fiscal consolidation, which submitted its report in September 2012. However, pending the implementation of the committee recommendations, the economy witnessed a period of a high level of fiscal deficit, a high level of interest rates, and a high level of inflation during the period up to 2012-13.
MONETARY POLICY SINCE 2013-14
As outlined in the literature review section, the SFC model (presented as an extension of Minskian hypothesis by Godley and Lavoie 2007) states that "measured at current prices, the government's budget deficit less the current account deficit is equal, by definition, to private saving net of investment." In its mathematical form, this translates to: Confrontation with the impossible trinity meant that the need for the RBI to maintain a particular level of interest rates in the economy (pursuant to fiscal challenges as discussed above) and its commitment to ensure free capital flows, restricted its ability to manage exchange rate stability in an effective manner. In such a situation, the exchange rate stability largely depends on market movements. In such a vulnerable situation, even a small trigger would precipitate episodes of currency volatility. In the Indian context, the trigger came in the form of The macro-economic situation from an external perspective also had structural issues that led to the rupee fall during this period. For instance, the current account deficit in India had reached an unsustainable level (4.8% of GDP in 2012-13) primarily as a result of slowdown in global growth, which has reduced demand for Indian exports. On the other hand, the share of gold in total imports increased since 2007-08 and was close to 3% of GDP in 2012-13. All these situations led to annualized daily volatility in the INR-USD exchange rate during May 23 to September 4, 2013, comparable to very few historical volatile episodes (see Table 6 below): The exchange rate position posed macro-economic challenges, which prompted the RBI to address the situation initially through monetary policy tools. In a move to reduce speculative trading in the dollar and to cut forward positions of banks, the RBI increased the marginal standing facility rate (short-term rate at which banks borrow from the RBI using their statutory liquidity ratio securities as collateral). Further, the RBI had also capped the amount banks can purposes; preventing the decline in long-term bond yields and issuing regulations for shielding banks from incurring financial losses due to declining bond prices.
As monetary policy became ineffective in influencing exchange rate movements, the RBI turned to certain unconventional measures in exchange rate management in September 2013, when Dr. Rajan took over as Governor of the RBI. In this context, it is important to outline that the RBI's stated policy with respect to exchange rate management, is that it is not guided by a fixed or pre-announced target or band. However, the RBI retained the flexibility to intervene in the market to manage excessive volatility and disruptions to macroeconomic stability and to take relevant measures. Continuing its stated objective, the measures taken by the RBI in the current episode included the following: attracting the flow of foreign currency deposits from non-resident Indians (with maturity of three years and above) through increased interest rates (arising from concessions offered by the RBI, such as swapping facility of such deposits with the Reserve Bank and exemptions from mandatory cash/statutory reserve requirements and directed lending programs); allowing additional avenues to borrowers for availing external commercial borrowings from their foreign equity holder companies without specific permission from the RBI; a foreign exchange swap program for oil marketing companies (OMCs); and increasing the overseas borrowing limit of banks from 50 to 100% of the unimpaired Tier I capital (with the option of a swap with the RBI). The RBI had also taken additional measures, in the form of expansion of bi-lateral currency swap arrangements with Japan, and steps for rationing gold imports (placing restrictions on gold imports by banks). In addition to these administrative measures, the RBI tightened its monetary policy as an immediate measure to shield against volatility emanating from the Fed's intention to taper its bond purchase program.
The measures taken by the RBI were supplemented by the Government of India by continuing the fiscal consolidation process in 2013-14, which it had initiated in 2012-13. The slowdown in economic growth affected tax collections, particularly indirect tax collections.
Further, the market conditions were not conducive to meeting disinvestment targets. However, the government pursued the path of fiscal consolidation through a sharp cutback in "plan"
expenditures and higher receipts of non-tax revenues that may not be recurring in nature. Incidentally, the blue-print for these financial sector reforms were laid down by Dr. Rajan himself through a Committee on Financial Sector Reforms constituted by the Government of India. The committee report, submitted in 2008, articulated that the country need to undertake financial sector reforms for at least three reasons: 1) to include more Indians in the growth process; 2) to foster growth itself; and 3) to improve financial stability, flexibility, and resilience, and thus protect the economy against the kind of turbulence that has affected emerging markets in the past, and is affecting industrial countries today. Echoing the Minskian perspectives of enhancing the institutional infrastructure to promote financial stability, the committee report stated that, "the role of the government is not to take on the tasks that should legitimately be delegated to the private sector, but to create an enabling environment by building sound financial infrastructure."
In order to ensure that such a steering of a new financial structure in the economy is undertaken in a calibrated manner, Dr. Rajan announced a five-pillar framework in November 2013 that is set to guide the development of RBI financial sector policies. Under this framework, first, the RBI is expected to focus on improving the banking system's ability to deal with corporate distress and financial institution distress by strengthening real and financial restructuring as well as debt recovery. Second, in order to achieve this, it was proposed under the framework that the RBI will strengthen banking structure through new entry, branch expansion, encouraging new varieties of banks, and moving foreign banks into better regulated organizational forms. Third, this move towards a new banking structure is supplemented with the objective to broaden and deepen financial markets and increase their liquidity and resilience so that they can help allocate and absorb the risks entailed in financing India's growth. Fourth, considering the role of banks in broader national economic development through large-scale financial inclusion, the framework also outlined its focus on expanding access to finance to small and medium enterprises, the unorganized sector, the poor, and remote and underserved areas of the country through technology, new business practices, and new organizational structures. Apart from the above measures, the fifth and the important pillar that is articulated under the new framework of the RBI relates to clarifying and strengthening the monetary policy framework.
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Pursuant to the five-pillar framework, the RBI has so far issued regulatory guidelines that focused on the creation of a framework for revitalization of distressed assets, instituting measures for the creation of a database of large corporate credits and focusing on the early sharing of credit information amongst bankers to ensure that they take all possible steps to ensure that borrowers do not slip off into the non-performing category once early warning signals are appropriately identified by at least one of the bankers. A blueprint for the new banking structure for India is also released by the RBI wherein the concept of new banks (payment banks and small banks) was proposed for public discussion. The RBI has set up internal committees for guiding monetary policy making and for strengthening the corporate governance at banks, the recommendations of which are currently being reviewed for implementation. Restructuring human resources at the RBI to equip them with challenges of macro-economic and financial stability is also an incidental objective outlined by Dr. Rajan while articulating the manner in which the five-pillar framework is going to be implemented by the RBI in the coming months.
The steps taken by the RBI in recent months under the governorship of Dr. Rajan thus reflect Minskian insights of viewing central banking as a "learning game" for affecting the performance of a changing system. In such a game, according to Minsky, "central banking can be successful only if central bankers know how the institutional structure at banks behave for sourcing its funding and correctly assess how this behavior affects the system" (Minsky 2008 [1986], p. 359). In other words of Minsky, central banks "have to steer the evolution of the financial structure" (Minsky 2008 (Minsky [1986 p. 359). The five-pillar framework of Dr. Rajan is aimed at such an evolution of new financial structure within the economy, the success of which is to be tested in future. It also underscored the steps taken by the RBI to strengthen the domestic banking sector and equip it with a sound financial infrastructure in order to ensure that macro-economic stability should eventually translate into financial stability in a sustainable manner in the long run.
CONCLUSION
Minsky once stated that the mainstream economic theory argues that the central bank authorities should:
"focus on the money supply and should operate to achieve a constant rate of growth of this construct. The authorities in large part accept the validity of this view. As a result, officials making monetary policy wear blinders that restrict their vision, so they tend to ignore the financing relations by which monetary phenomenon affect activity. The money-supply blinders worn by the authorities in effect dismiss the ways in which portfolio transformations occur and how they affect the stability of the economy." (Minsky 1986 (Minsky (2008 
c) Exchange Rate Policy Adds Another Dimension to Monetary Policy
On one hand, pro-cyclical fiscal policy places constraints on monetary policy, and on the other hand, it results in trade deficit financing an important aspect of foreign exchange rate management. Trade deficits, when fiscal deficits are on constant rise, need to be financed through cross-border capital inflows. Thus the monetary policy on one hand is constrained by interest rate management and on the other hand foreign capital inflows owing to their volatile nature present added dynamics to monetary policy operation. This leads to an "impossible trinity" problem, where the exchange rate stability is threatened as the central bank loses its ability to influence the same with its focus on the interest rate and free capital inflows.
The impossible trinity further presents two specific problems for central banks in emerging economies. On one hand, they put pressure on effective communication strategies of central banks in order to explain their stance of not having control on one of three variables: the exchange rate, financial integration, and interest rates. Such an explicit communication often articulated in terms of leaving the exchange rate to market forces, interest rates to fiscal policy situations and financial integration situations to global developments may therefore impact the "credibility bonus" central banks should enjoy in restoring confidence in financial markets. On the other hand, Aizenman et al. (2008) argue that emerging market economies are holding voluminous international reserves, which helped them to pursue both a higher level of exchange rate stability and a higher weighted average of the other two policy goals through active foreign exchange interventions. Obstfeld et al. (2008) argued that reserve accumulation, as a key tool for managing domestic financial instability, is used by central banks to protect the domestic banking sector, and domestic credit markets more broadly, while limiting external currency depreciation. Therefore, the contours of exchange rate management policy further extend to the manner in which reserve management strategies are to be pursued by central banks in emerging economies.
The Indian experience thus leaves us an insight that the the effectiveness of monetary policy in achieving macro-economic stability in emerging economies is constrained by exchange rate management policy pursued by central banks. Effectiveness of the central bank communication in currency-volatile situations and its ability to manage forex reserves on an ongoing basis will continue to influence monetary policy outcomes.
d) Development of Appropriate Financial Institution Infrastructure is a Pre-condition for the Successful Pursuit of Monetary Policy
As can be seen from the above conclusions, the successful operation of monetary policy depends in turn on the effectiveness of its regulatory policy, its exchange rate management policy, and the fiscal policy of government. However, the ability of these policies to influence the economy in turn depends upon their effective transmission, which in turn assumes a welldefined financial institution infrastructure is in place in the economy. In the absence of such infrastructure, the ability of monetary policy to influence the banking activity is constrained by factors such as inability of legal framework to address corporate/banking sector distress, and situations of inadequate liquidity arising on account of ineffectiveness of payment and settlement systems. Therefore in order to ensure that monetary policy is effectively implemented to achieve the desired outcome, regulatory reforms should focus on building a resilient financial institution infrastructure through robust credit information sharing arrangements (to identify early corporate distress and take remedial action), effective bankruptcy arrangements to protect the interests of bank lenders, and well-developed payment and settlement systems that provide desired liquidity into the system. The Indian experience outlines the steps being taken by the RBI toward the evolution of a new banking structure in the economy that is conducive towards effective implementation of monetary policy by the central bank.
e) Multiple Policies Present Co-ordination Issues
The Indian experience outlines the perspective that there are four components to macroeconomic stability-price stability, financial stability, fiscal stability, and exchange rate stability. Accordingly, macro-economic stability could be achieved through four specific public policies-monetary policy (for price stability), regulatory policy (for financial stability), fiscal policy (for fiscal stability), and exchange rate management policy (for exchange rate stability).
However, all policies, other than monetary policies have multiple instruments that could result in multiple outcomes. However, the impact of these outcomes is generally seen on monetary policy, which has limited instruments (manipulation of interest rates and reserve money in the economy) at its disposal. Thus monetary policy independence in an emerging market economy is highly dependent upon the coordination between various individual policies (regulatory, fiscal and exchange rate management) and monetary policy.
Multiplicity of policies also often leads to confusion when policy makers choose to apply one policy instrument for a different policy objective. Three examples observed during 2013 can be cited based on the discussion in the previous sections of this paper. First, the application of a monetary policy instrument (raising short-term interest rates) by the RBI for exchange rate management, which has done collateral damage in terms of a rise in price of bonds with its financial impact on the banking system. Second, in order to contain the currency volatility, the RBI has to finally apply regulatory policy by issuing guidelines for a) restricting banks from importing gold and b) giving relaxations to reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits, thereby enabling bankers to pass on the benefit to depositors 4 in the form of higher interest rates. Third, the application of a monetary policy tool (raising the interest rates)
to contain inflation that is considered to be resulting from fiscal operations of the Government of India. Such inconsistent policy applications for varied objectives pose coordination problems in the policy-making sphere.
There have been studies in the existing academic literature that reviewed inter-linkages between monetary, fiscal and regulatory policies to a large extent, however only by taking two policies at a time (for instance, monetary policy and fiscal policy coordination, or monetary policy and regulatory policy coordination). However, new areas of research will emerge with a) the extension of this coordination problem to inter-se amongst all three policies and b) the inclusion of an exchange rate policy to this coordination exercise. The experience of the Indian economy during the last decade offers interesting insights and provides further empirical evidence in this direction.
